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Abstract
This paper investigates the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the
presence of corruption. After the sponsor and the contractor sign the contract,
the latter may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. Thus, the mechanism
a¤ects whether bribery occurs. I show how to include bribery as an additional
constraint in the optimal-control problem that the sponsor solves, and charac-
terize the optimal contract. I discuss both the case of xed bribes and bribes
that depend on the size of the quality misrepresentation, and also uncertainty
about the size of the bribe. In all cases, the optimal contract curtails quality
not only for low e¢ ciency contractors but also for the most e¢ cient contractors.
Implementation is also discussed.
1 Introduction
There has been growing interest in recent years in both the economic e¤ects of cor-
ruption and also potential remedies for dealing with it. In particular, auction theorists
have sought to understand how manipulation and bribe-taking a¤ect the allocation and
surplus-sharing when particular mechanisms are used to allocate contracts or goods.
The literature has studied specic ways (typically, bid readjusment) in which an agent
acting on behalf of the principal may, in exchange for a bribe, favor a contractor in some
particular auction mechanism. (See, among other, Lambert-Mogiliansky, and Verdier,
Indranil Chakraborty is responsible for my interest in this problem. I thank him for having spent
time working with me on it. I also thank audiences in U. of Illinois, U. of North Carolina, Duke U.,
Michigan State U., U. of Cologne, XXIX JEI, EARIE 2014, CEME2014, AMES2014, IO Workshop
in Hangzhou, and Procurement Workshop in Rio de Janeiro. Finally, I acknowledge nancial support
from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (Grant: ECO2011-29663), and the Generalitat
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2005, Menezes and Monteiro, 2006, Burguet and Perry, 2007, Koc and Neilson, 2008,
Arozamena and Weinschelbaum, 2009, or Lengwiler and Wolfstetter, 2010.) In these
papers, the agents ability to manipulate is dened in reference to the particular mech-
anism itself. The analysis of remedies is limited in scope, and for good reason: the
mere question of what is an optimal mechanism from the principals point of view may
be ill-dened in these settings.
For example, assume that an agent in charge of running a sealed-bid, rst-price
procurement auction is able to learn the bids before they are publicly opened, and is
also able to adjust downward one of the contractorsbid, if that bid is not already
the lowest. This is the model studied in most of the papers previously mentioned.
If instead, the procurement mechanism was an oral auction, this ability would be
irrelevant. Even in a second-price auction, altering one contractors bid would be of
no value to that contractor. Perhaps in either of these other auction formats the agent
may manipulate the outcome by other means. The question would then become what
is the equivalentto bid readjustment in those, or any, other auction formats? That
is, the question of what constitutes an optimal procurement format, in the presence of
corruption, takes us to a more complex problem: dening what a corrupt procurement
agent may do under each of the possible mechanisms the principal may design?
Note that, if the corrupt agents ability to bend the rules depends on the rules
themselves, the problem for the principal is not one where standard tools in mechanism
design may be used. Even the revelation principle is problematic, as equivalence of
mechanisms cannot be predicated without reference to equivalence of manipulation.
That is, given the lack of a simple way of establishing equivalence classes in the set of
mechanisms, restricting attention to revelation games may simply be of no use.
That is the bad news. Now for the good news. The literature has considered one
important form of corruption in procurement which originates in the need for quality
assessment, when quality, and not only price, is an argument in the principals objective
function. (See Celentani and Ganuza, 2002, and Burguet and Che, 2004.) This is the
problem that is studied in this paper. The agent is not an awarding authority that may
tamper with bids or, in general, with the allocation of the contract, but an inspector
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that assesses the quality promised or delivered, and may, if corrupt, take bribes in
order to misrepresent that assessment. We begin by showing that standard tools in
mechanism design may be adapted to characterize and analyze this problem. As we
discuss below, the e¤ect of this sort of corruption is to transform an adverse selection
problem into an adverse-selection/moral-hazard problem to which standard tools may
be applied.
We rst consider the most simple scenario where a procurement agent in charge of
assessing delivered quality will certify whatever level the contractor wishes, in exchange
for a xed bribe. This is common knowledge, whereas the cost of delivering quality
is the contractors private information. The key, simple observation is that a (direct)
mechanism may then be dened as a triple of functions that species not only the
quality and the price for each typeof contractor, but also whether the contractor
should bribe or not. This is the moral hazard dimension that bribery introduces. As
with collusion-proofness (see Tirole, 1986), dealing with corruption then adds a new
incentive compatibility constraint to the sponsors choice. In this case, the constraint
that guarantees that the contractor does not have incentives to disregard the instruction
with respect to bribing.
I characterize optimal mechanisms under this scenario. I show that, when bribing
binds, it imposes a bound on the levels and range of quality that are implementable.
In response, the principal gives up inducing any (non-trivial) quality for an interval at
the low-e¢ ciency tail of types. This is probably not surprising. What is more subtle is
that bribery is also problematic at the other end of the type domain. Indeed, due to the
possibility of bribing, the sponsor optimally curtails the quality that it contracts with
the most e¢ cient contractors. Obtaining higher quality from these types obviously
requires promising them a higher price. That, in turn, makes it more attractive for
low-e¢ ciency types to bribe the agent in order to claim a high e¢ ciency and so high
quality, while delivering less of it. Therefore, the higher the quality contracted with
high-e¢ ciency types the tighter the incentive constraint for lower-e¢ ciency types.
When the cost of manipulation, i.e., the size of bribe, is xed and common knowl-
edge, the possibility of bribery binds, but bribery does not occur when the sponsor uses
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the optimal mechanism. The same would be true if there was uncertainty about the
size of the required bribe, but the uncertainty was resolved only after the project had
been completed. However, things are di¤erent if the uncertainty about the required
bribe was resolved after contracting but before the project was completed. Completely
preventing bribery may not be in the sponsors interest in that case. I characterize the
optimal mechanism under this alternative bribe model. In that mechanism, no type
bribes with probability one, but bribery may occur with positive probability for all
types. Indeed, after quality is contracted and the required bribe learnt by the contrac-
tor, the contractor will always choose whatever is cheaper: bribing or delivering. If
the size of the necessary bribe happens to be very low, bribing will always be cheaper
than delivering any non trivial quality. Thus, bribery can be seen as a modication
of the contractors cost function. Other than that, the problem is technically very
similar to the design problem in the absence of corruption. The e¤ect of bribery is
that, again, no quality is contracted for the low tail of e¢ ciency types, and is lower for
all types of contractor, even the most e¢ cient one, than in the absence of corruption.
That is, qualitatively, the e¤ect of bribery is similar whether bribes are paid or not in
equilibrium.
I also consider the case where the size of the bribe depends on the size of manip-
ulation obtained from the inspector. If the required bribe is (su¢ ciently) concave in
the size of manipulation, the conclusions are similar to the known, xed-bribe case.
Indeed, a xed bribe may be thought of as an extreme example of a concave bribe.
Under su¢ cient concavity, the conclusions of the model are not a¤ected: moral-hazard
incentive compatibility is binding for the lowest e¢ ciency types who may imitate the
highest e¢ ciency type. No bribes are paid in the optimal mechanism, and quality is
curtailed at both ends of the type distribution.
The convex case, on the contrary, is similar to the xed but uncertain bribe case. In
particular, if the marginal cost of bribing is very low for very low levels of manipulation,
all types will nd it attractive to buysome manipulation instead of delivering all the
contracted quality. As a result, bribery for all types will also be part of the outcome of
the optimal mechanism. Under some assumptions on the convexity of the bribe, this
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again is akin to a modication of the contractors cost function. The e¤ects of bribery
on (delivered) quality are then similar to the case of an uncertain but xed bribe.
To my knowledge, this is the rst paper that investigates procurement mechanism
design in the presence of bribery when the mechanism a¤ects the incidence of bribery.
In their insightful paper, Celentani and Ganuza (2002) do study the optimal mecha-
nism with a corrupt agent who may adjust bids and misrepresent assessment. However,
(potential) corrupt deals pre-date the principals choice of mechanism, and so the mech-
anism cannot a¤ect quality, if corrupt deals indeed took place. Moreover, the authors
assume that information rents are determined as in the absence of bribery, justifying
this assumption on the need for hidingcorrupt deals. Under these assumptions, the
sponsor knows that she will pay for quality as if no corruption existed, but will obtain
that quality with a xed, exogenous probability lower than one. Therefore, the spon-
sor optimally induces lower quality from all types: the optimal mechanisms coincides
with the optimal mechanism in the absence of bribery when quality is multiplied by a
constant equal to that exogenous probability of actually getting the contracted quality.
One additional contribution of this paper is to solve one problem where incen-
tive constraints bind not only locally. In the xed and concave bribe cases, incentive
compatibility related to moral hazard (no bribing) means that no type should have
incentives to imitate one particular type: i.e., the most e¢ cient. This constraint is
most stringent for the least e¢ cient type. I then solve the optimal mechanism for
a given quality expected from the most e¢ cient type as a free-time, xed-endpoint
control problem. The optimal mechanism is this solution when the quality expected
from the most e¢ cient type is also optimal. That is, when the sponsors surplus in the
solution to the optimal control problem is maximized with respect to that quality.
In the next section, I present the basic model with a xed bribe and obtain the
optimal mechanism for this case. Section 3 introduces uncertainty concerning the size of
the bribe and characterizes the optimal mechanism for that case. Section 4 discusses
a di¤erent model of bribery where the size of the bribe depends on the amount of
manipulation, and obtains conclusions both for the (su¢ ciently) concave and convex
cases. Section 5 discusses implementation of the optimal procurement rules obtained.
5
Some concluding remarks close the paper. An appendix contains all proofs.
2 The model
A sponsor procures a contract of xed size and variable quality, q 2 [0;1). Quality q
measures the sponsors willingness to pay for the project. That is, the payo¤ for the
sponsor when she pays P and receives a project with realized quality q is simply q P .
The sponsors goal is to maximize the expected value of that payo¤.
A contractor is able to undertake the project and deliver quality q at a cost C(q; ),
where  2 [; ] is the contractors type and her private information. From the sponsors
point of view,  is the realization of some random variable with cdf F and density f in
[; ], and this is common knowledge. We postulate a di¤erentiable C with C; Cq > 0,
and Cq; Cqq > 0. This guarantees that, in the absence of bribery, monotonicity of q
with respect to  is virtually all that is needed for implementation. Also, we assume
that C(0; ) = 0, for all , and that
Cq(q; ) + Cq(q; )
F ()
f()
(1)
is increasing both in q and in . This guarantees interior (to monotonicity constraints)
solution for the optimal mechanism in the absence of bribery. (See Che, 1993.)
Zero quality should be interpreted as a standard minimum quality, and a positive
quality as quality obtained at an additional cost to the contractor. Likewise, a price of
zero corresponds to a payment that equals the (common) cost of honoring the contract
at a standard, minimum quality, q = 0.
Under observability of quality, and so without any role for the inspector, a direct
mechanism is a pair (p; q), where p : [; ]! R and q : [; ]! R+. p() represents the
payment that the contractor gets and q() represents the quality that the contractor
provides. Both are functions of the contractors type. The sponsor needs to consider
only incentive compatible, individually rational, direct mechanisms. Among them, the
optimal one is characterized by quality qNB() that satises
1  Cq(qNB(); )  Cq(qNB(); )F ()
f()
= 0: (2)
6
as long as
qNB()  C(qNB(); )  C(qNB(); )F ()
f ()
; (3)
and qNB() = 0 otherwise. (See Che, 1993.) In order to simplify the analysis and
also concentrate on the interesting results below, we will assume that (3) holds with
equality when evaluated at  and qNB() = 0 so that qNB() > 0, for all  < .1
In this paper, we are interested in analyzing the case when quality q is not directly
observable. Instead, the sponsor requires an agent, the inspector, who assesses (or
certies) the quality of the completed project. The inspector can observe q without
cost.
The inspector can also accept bribes to be untruthfulwhen reporting on quality.
For now, we assume that the agent will do so in exchange for a xed bribe B. In later
sections we will consider more general specications of B.2 In any case, we should note
that the bribe B includes any (expected) payment by the contractor associated with
bribing the agent.
Under the threat of bribery, we may dene a direct mechanism as a triple (p; q; b),
where p and q are dened and interpreted as above, and b : [; ]! f0; 1g. We interpret
b() = 1 as an instruction to bribe and b() = 0 as an instruction not to bribe. Also,
we should interpret q() as the contracted quality, not necessarily the delivered one.3
Let
() = b() (p() B) + (1  b()) (p()  C(q(); ))
The mechanism is implementable if it satises incentive compatibility (IC) and
individual rationality (IR), as in any standard problem:
IR) For all  2 [; ], ()  0.
1If (3) is negative at  for q = 0, everything that follows applies with only redening the domain
of types to the interval where (3) is non negative. Also, if (3) is strictly positive at  and for q = 0;
then the value of c dened later may be equal to, not strictly smaller than, . That "corner" solution
would not a¤ect any other insight.
2In all cases, we do not consider the possibility of "extortion", that is, the possibility that the
inspector asks for bribes in order to report the truth, threatening to otherwise report lower quality
than what is actually delivered. Note that in this type of corrupt behavior the parties involved,
inspector and contractor, have conicting interest. This is contrary to the cases studied in this paper.
3For the moment, we do not need to specify delivered quality: if b() = 1, then delivered quality
will be 0, and otherwise it will be q().
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IC) For all ; z 2 [; ], ()  p(z) min fC(q(z); ); Bg.
Incentive compatibility incorporates adverse selection and moral hazard constraints.
In particular, for b() = 0, ()  p()   B. That is, the contractors prots should
be at least as large as the prot she could get by simply bribing. Note that incentive
compatibility implies that if b() = 1, then delivered quality will be 0, and so we do
not need to specify delivered quality when b() = 1.
The problem for the sponsor is to design the direct, implementable mechanism
(p; q; b) that maximizes her expected payo¤, E [q()(1  b())  p()].
When the bribe B is known and xed, that optimal mechanism cannot include
an instruction to bribe for any type of contractor. The contractor would still have
incentives to report truthfully her type if, instead, the mechanism asked her to deliver
0 quality and o¤ered her a price of p() B. The sponsor can thus get the same quality
for a lower price. Indeed,
Lemma 1 For any IC, IR direct mechanism, (p; q; b), there exists an IC, IR mecha-
nism with b() = 0 8 2 [; ], so that E [q()(1  b())  p()] is higher for the latter.
Thus, in this basic setting, bribery does not occur in the optimal mechanism, so
we can restrict attention to mechanisms with b() = 0, but bribery does still impose
restrictions on mechanisms for IC and IR to hold.
In particular, standard necessary conditions for IC and IR (under no bribery) are
still necessary. Indeed, even without intending to bribe the inspector, the contractor
should have incentives to report her type truthfully. Three consequences follow from
these necessary conditions. First, () must be monotone decreasing. In fact,
(z; )  p(z)  C(q(z); )
satises the conditions of Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002), so that
() = p()  C(q(); ) = () +
Z

C(q(z); z)dz; (4)
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and is absolutely continuous. That virtually xes p() as a function of q(). Second,
and as a result, a necessary but also su¢ cient condition for IR is ()  0. Third,
monotonicity can also be extended to q and p in a standard way.
Lemma 2 In any IC mechanism, p() and q() are monotone decreasing.
These features, which are shared by any feasible mechanism in the absence of cor-
ruption, have important consequences that make this problem tractable. Indeed, since
p is monotone, a bribing contractor of any type would maximize prots by claiming
type . Also, since  is monotone, type  is the type with the strongest incentives to
bribe. Thus, the only constraint imposed by bribery that binds is
()  p() B:
That is, substituting for p() from (4),
B  C(q(); ) +
Z

C(q(z); z)dz: (5)
The main insight in this section is contained in (5). Bribery constrains the variation
allowed to q(). When corruption is absent, the sponsor optimally asks for higher
quality when it is less costly to obtain (when  is lower). However, increases in quality
require faster increases in prices, and high di¤erences in prices cannot be sustained
when bribing is inexpensive. This puts a limit on the range of quality levels that can
be commanded.
It is a quite standard result that these conditions are not only necessary but also
su¢ cient for implementation, provided that Cq(q; ). Thus, the problem that the
sponsor solves is
max
p;q
Z

fq()  p()g f () d;
s.t. ()  0; (4); (5) and subject to q() being monotone decreasing.
9
IR binds in the solution to this problem.4 Thus, p() = C
 
q(); 

. The constraint
(5) may not bind. Indeed, if (5) holds for qNB(), then this is also the optimal mecha-
nism under bribery. However, the case of interest is when B is su¢ ciently small so that
(5) does bind. The following proposition characterizes the optimal mechanism also for
this case
Proposition 3 If (5) holds for the optimal mechanism without bribery, qNB(), then
(qNB; pNB; b) with b() = 0 for all , is the optimal mechanism under bribery. Other-
wise, there exist a and c, with  < a  c <  such that at the optimal mechanism;
(i) q() = 0 if  > c ; (ii) q() = qNB() if  2 (a; c); and (iii) q() = qNB(a) if
 < a.
Thus, when the size of the bribe is xed and known and bribery is a relevant
constraint, the sponsor gives up the possibility of obtaining (an increase in) quality
from contractors with very high costs. This result is not surprising. Indeed, recall that
bribery imposes a limit on the range of possible quality levels that can be commanded.
If the sponsor is going to shave this range, she optimally does so for types with low
e¢ ciency. The loss from such distortion is lowest when the contractor has one of these
types. But, perhaps less obviously, quality is optimally distorted also at the top, i.e.,
when the contractor has a high e¢ ciency.
The intuition behind this result is simple. (See Figure 1.) AssumeB > C(qNB(); ),
but also assume that (5) binds for qNB().5 That is,
B < C(qNB(); ) +
Z

C(
NB(z); z)dz:
It is then feasible to distort only at the bottom. That is, to select c that solves
B = C(q(); ) +
R c

C(q(z); z)dz, and let q() = qNB() for all   c and q() = 0
for all  > c. This is represented in Figure 1. The thick line represents qNB() and the
4Indeed, for any mechanism (q; p) so that () = p()   C  q();  =  > 0, we can dene a
mechanism (q0; p0) with q0 = q and q and p0 = p    for all . The new mechanism satises all the
above constraints and results in a higher payo¤ for the sponsor.
5Of course, if B < C(qNB(); ) then distortion at the top is imposed by constraint (5) on any
implementable mechanism.
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thin line this q(). Now consider the e¤ects of reducing q() for all types in [; +") to
the level q( + "). Firstly, it implies obtaining a lower quality from types in [;  + ")
and consequently reducing the payment to those types of contractor, just as in the
absence of bribery. This e¤ect is of second order when q() = qNB(). Secondly, it
also implies a more relaxed no-bribing constraint, as it is now less protable to claim a
type  when the type is in fact higher. That is, the reduction in q() allows raising c.
This is a rst-order e¤ect, as types that fall between the old and the new values of c
can now be asked to supply quality qNB(c) at a price C(q(c); c) instead of quality 0
at price 0. In other words, a reduction in q() allows the contractor to expect positive
levels of quality from the previously marginal type c. This e¤ect is rst-order, and
therefore distorting at the top is surplus improving for the sponsor.
q
qq q
)(qN Bq
Dq
Ñq
qNB
Figure 1
3 Bribing in equilibrium
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the optimal mechanism discussed in the previous
section is that quality is distorted at the high end of the distribution of contractor types.
That is, bribery imposes a quality ceiling. However, the nding that bribery is not an
equilibrium phenomenon is a consequence of assuming that B, the size of the bribe, is
xed and common knowledge, so that the sponsor should virtually buythe possibility
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of bribing. Suppose, instead, that B is uncertain at the time of contracting, and is only
learnt by the contractor after the terms of the contract have been set but before quality
is delivered.6,7 In particular, assume now that B takes values in some interval, [B;B]
according to some c.d.f. G with density g. We will make the standard assumption that
1 G(B)
g(B)
is decreasing in B.
To simplify the analysis, we may also assume that B is su¢ ciently low, say B = 0.
(At the end of this section, we will comment on the consequence of not assuming so.)
Under these conditions, an optimal mechanism is not bribe-proof in general. Indeed,
preventing all types of contractor from bribing in all probability -when B is low- may
be too expensive for the sponsor.
Thus, we should now dene a contract as a triple (p; q; b), where p : [; ]! R and
q : [; ]! R+, as before, and b : [; ]! [B;B]. b() is now interpreted as the cut-o¤
value for B so that type  is instructed to bribe if and only if B < b(). It is su¢ cient
to consider mechanisms of this form. Indeed, if a contractor prefers not to bribe when
the size of the bribe is B, she will also prefer not to bribe when the size of the bribe is
larger than B. Contrary, if the contractor prefers to bribe when the size of the bribe
is B, then she also prefers to bribe if the size of the bribe is smaller than B. Thus, IC
will require that the instruction to bribe takes a cut-o¤ form. Also, as in the previous
section, we do not have to specify what quality is to be delivered if bribing: IC requires
that quality to be 0.
As we have mentioned, in genera, bribing will take place in equilibrium, but there
is still a counterpart to Lemma 1:
Lemma 4 For any IC and IR mechanism where at least one type  bribes with proba-
bility 1, there is another IC and IR mechanism where no type bribes with probability 1
and results in (weakly) higher payo¤ for the sponsor.
6This would t a case where the agent in charge of quality assessment is hired after the contract
has been signed. Note that, if the contractor privately learnt B before signing the contract, we would
have a standard mechanism-design problem where the contractors "type" would be (;B).
7The case where uncertainty about B is resolved after the quality is delivered is equivalent to the
xed and known B, with only substituting EB for B. Indeed, in that case the decision whether to
bribe or not would have to be taken before providing quality. Not providing quality but claiming to do
so would require the contractor to pay the bribe B whatever its realization, whereas if the contractor
provides quality there is no point in also paying the bribe.
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Thus, we may restrict attention to mechanisms with b() < B. Also, since B = 0,
all types for which q() > 0 will bribe with positive probability.8 That is, b() > B
for those types. Finally, we may restrict attention to mechanisms such that () = 0.
Given any other IC and IR mechanism, a reduction in p constant over  would be
feasible without a change in incentives and participation.
Assuming that the size of B is uncertain at the time of contracting changes the
nature of the moral-hazard incentives for the contractor. Indeed, whatever quality the
contractor has commited to, she will prefer to bribe if, and only if, the realized value of
the bribe is less than the cost of providing that quality. Thus, if she reports her type
truthfully, IC requires
b() = C(q(); ): (6)
This is a moral-hazard, incentive compatibility constraint and denes b() once q() is
determined. Moreover, this constraint is equivalent to a modication of the contractors
(expected) cost function. Indeed, whatever quality q a contractor of type  commits
to, her expected cost of honoring this commitment is now
(q; ) = EB min fC(q; ); Bg :
Therefore, (su¢ cient) uncertainty about the size of the bribe renders the problem
of designing an optimal mechanism for procurement a standard one with a modied
cost funtion. Consequently, we can use exactly the same tools that we use in the design
problem without bribery. Let
(z; ) = p(z)  (q(z); ):
This function again satises the conditions of Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002),
so that, since () = arg maxz (z; ), we can write
() = p()  (q(); ) = () +
Z

C(q(z); z) [1 G(C(q(z); z))] dz: (7)
8Note that, if B = 0, only zero quality could avoid bribery. Thus, unless the sponsor gives up
any hope to obtain positive quality with positive probability, indeed all types will bribe with positive
probability.
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As in the previous section, monotonicity of q() and () is necessary for implementa-
tion. Also, this together with (6), (7), and ()  0 is su¢ cient as long as q(q; ) > 0.
This condition requires C(q; ) [1 G(C(q; ))], and not only C(q; ), to be increasing
in q. It is satised, for instance, if B is disperse, so that g is small for any value of B.
The expected surplus for the sponsor can be written as
Z

f[1 G(C(q(); ))] [q()  C(q(); )]  ()g f()d; (8)
where, in an IC mechanism, () is given in (7). We are now ready to discuss the
optimal mechanism for the sponsor.
Proposition 5 There exists d, with  < d   such that at the optimal mechanism;
(i) q() = 0 if  > d; and (ii) if  < d, then q() solves
0 =
1 G(C(q; ))
g(C(q; ))

1  Cq(q; )  Cq(q; )F ()
f()

(9)
 Cq(q; )

q   C(q; )  C(q; )F ()
f()

:
The intuition behind this result is relatively straightforward when considering the
Hamiltonian of the problem that the sponsors choice of q solves. Suppressing the
variables in the functions for compactness, this Hamiltonian is
H = (1 G(C)) [(q   C) f   FC] :
Note that in the absence of bribery, the corresponding Hamiltonian would be
HNB = (q   C) f   FC:
Thus,
H = (1 G(C))HNB:
The interpretation is simple. Quality q() will be delivered with probability 1 G(C),
and then with that probability, the decision on q will have the same consequences on
contractor rents, cost, and sponsor surplus, as in the absence of bribery. This is the
phenomenon captured in Celentani and Ganuza (2002). In the present setting, this
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would have no e¤ect on q, but only on the prices, p.9 However, q() will also a¤ect
the probability of bribery through its e¤ect on the threshold b() = C(q(); ). This
represents an additional e¤ect of a small increase in q() of
 g(C)CqHNB < 0:
Indeed, a (small) increase in q will increase by g(C)Cq the probability that the sponsor
gets 0 quality, instead of q, in exchange for the price. Thus, for values of q that solve
@HNB
@q
= 0, the presence of this negative e¤ect of a small increase in q would imply that
@H
@q
< 0.10 Thus, the solution under bribery implies lower values of q for any .
For high enough types, , so that that qNB() is positive but small, the optimal
answer is to relinquish the possibility of obtaining any quality above the minimum.
Just as in the xed-bribe case, attempting to do so would be too expensive in terms of
rents.
Also, as in the xed bribe case, distortions at the top are part of the optimal
mechanism. Indeed, for the most e¢ cient type, q() solves
1 G(C)
g(C)
[1  Cq] = Cq [q   C] :
The left hand side is zero at qNB(), since under no bribery there is no distortion at the
top. But the right hand since is positive at that value. Thus, indeed q() < qNB().
In summary, an uncertain bribe is equivalent to a modication of the contractors
cost function. Local IC constraints are correspondingly modied, which implies quality
distortions for all type of contractors, and bribe payment with positive probability.
We have assumed that the lower support of the distribution of B was su¢ ciently
low so as to make it too expensive for the sponsor to avoid bribery completely, even for
the most e¢ cient type.11 If B was larger, we could use the same techniques used in the
proof of Proposition 6 to obtain the optimal mechanism, but this time the constraint
9In Celentani and Ganuza (2002), the e¤ect on q appears from the fact that the price is determined
by non-corrupt contractors, who are assumed to act as in the absence of corruption. Therefore, the
only way of controlling bribery rents is by a¤ecting quality.
10Of course, if G(C(q(); ) = 0 when evaluated at the q() that solves @H
NB
@q
= 0, then bribery
does not change q().
11Also, if B is su¢ ciently high, then bribery will not be binding.
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would be 0() =  C(q(); ) [1 G (minfC(q(); ); Bg)]. Thus, in the solution to
that problem, we will have q() = qNB() whenever C(qNB(); ) < B. Note that
as long as (2) denes a continuous and monotone qNB(), that solution q() is also
continuous and monotone, so indeed it denes the optimal mechanism.
4 Bribe models
In the previous sections, we considered extremely simple models of bribery. The in-
spector was willing to alter her assessment of quality with no bounds, and in exchange
for a xed bribe. That model of bribery may appear too simplistic, but in this section
I will show that the main ndings extend to a considerably more general set of models.
Let us return to the deterministic case, where the cost of manipulation is common
knowledge at the time of contracting. Suppose now that the cost of manipulation
(bribe and any other cost) is increasing with the size of that misrepresentation. That
is, a quality overstatement of size m requires a "bribe" B(m), with B0 > 0.
Before discussing this case, note that the xed, known-bribe case in Section 2 is an
extreme case of a concave, increasing B(m). Indeed, there B(0) = 0, and B(m) = B
for all m > 0. Also, although more subtle, the xed, unknown bribe case in Section
3 can be thought of as a convex, increasing B(m). Indeed, a contractor (with type )
who contracts delivery of quality q will buy expected manipulation G(C(q; ))q. The
ratio of expected bribe to expected manipulation,Z C(q;)
0
Bg(B)dB
G(C(q; ))q
is increasing in q, and expected manipulation is also incresing in q.
This is indicative that the results in those sections may actually extend to the
increasing, known case we treat here, depending on the curvature of B(m). We show
now that this is, in a precise sense, true.
But, what is the meaning of the curvature of B? A concave B(m) occurs when
it is quite costly to engage the inspector in illegal activities, but increasing degrees
of manipulation can be obtained at decreasing additional cost. On the other hand,
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convexity occurs when petty corruptionis a kind of accepted, or tolerated, norm, but
larger misrepresentations may risk crossing the line. Thus, although corruption is a
threat in all societies, the curvature of B may be linked to the extent to which honesty
is a standard in the society.
4.1 Concave B(m)
Let us rst consider the concave case. Su¢ cient concavity, as obtained under the
assumptions below, implies that, if bribing, the contractor will still do so to claim the
most e¢ cient type. That is, she will o¤er the highest quality by claiming the lowest
type  and in fact deliver quality 0. Thus, once again corruption will introduce only
one additional, global constraint similar to (5).
This is a set of su¢ cient assumptions for that to be the case:
A1)  B00(m) > Cqq(q  m; ) for all m  q all , and all q  qNB().
A2) B0(qNB()) < Cq(qNB(); ) for all .
A3) B(qNB()) > C(qNB(); )
A3 simplies the analysis: if it were violated for some type , then we would have
to consider an additional constraint on the quality that could be obtained from .
Under A1, for any type  of the contractor and any (relevant) contracted quality level
q, C (q  m; ) + B(m) is concave and so will be minimized either without bribes, or
with bribe m = q. A2 implies that pNB()  B(qNB()) is monotone in . We discuss
later the consequences of violating A1 and A2.
Also, we will restrict attention to cases whereC(qNB(); ) > B(qNB()) > C(qNB(); ).
If the second inequality did not hold, then it would be impossible to obtain quality
qNB(), since even for type  it would be cheaper to bribe. Thus, the ceiling on qual-
ity would be exogenously imposed. If the rst inequality did not hold, bribery would
never be a concern. Therefore the only interesting cases are those that satisfy the two
inequalities.
In this new setting, a direct mechanism must not only specify whether to bribe or
not, but also how much to bribe. Since B() is invertible, this is equivalent to deter-
mining the degree of manipulation exerted by the inspector. Thus, we can represent a
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mechanism as a triple (p; q;m) : [; ]! R3, where now q() represents the contracted
quality and m() the amount of quality manipulation. That is, delivered quality will
be q() m().
It is straightforward to extend Lemma 1 to this scenario.
Lemma 6 For any IC, IR direct mechanism, (p; q;m), there exists an IC, IR mecha-
nism with m() = 0 8 2 [; ], so that E [q() m()  p()] is higher for the latter.
Now, for a mechanism with m() = 0 for all , incentive compatibility requires that
 = arg max
z
fp(z)  C(q(z); )g (10)
is satised. As we mentioned above, assumption A1 implies that if a type  of contractor
bribes to claim a type z, then optimally she will either buy manipulation m = 0 or
m = q(z). (10) implies that the rst choice is never preferred to truthful reporting.
Thus, we will only need to consider the case when the contractor fully bribes in order
to claim a type other than .
Just as in Section 2, (10) also implies monotonicity of q, p, and (). Therefore,
the type of contractor that has more incentives to bribe to claim any type  so as to
obtain prots p() B(q()) is a contractor of ype . In particular, IC imposes
()  p () B (q ()) ; (11)
the equivalent of (5), which can also be written:
B (q ())  C(q(); ) +
Z

C(q(z); z)dz:
Also, (4) still denes p() once q() is determined. Therefore, A2 and monotonicity
of q() guarantees that (11) is the only constraint that bribing imposes. Thus, to all
e¤ects, the bribe is still xed and equal to B(q()), once q() is determined. Conse-
quently,
Proposition 7 Under concavity of B(m), A1, A2, and A3, if qNB() violates (11)
then there exist a and c, with  < a  c <  such that at the optimal mechanism;
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(i) q() = 0 if  > c ; (ii) q() = qNB() if  2 (a; c); and (iii) q() = qNB(a) if
 < a.
The strategy of the proof of Proposition 3 was to discuss the properties of the
solution to the sponsors problem for an exogenously given q(). These properties carry
over to the concave B(m) case. The only di¤erence with Section 2 is that now q()
a¤ects also the left hand side of the no-bribe constraint (11). Yet, A2 still guarantees
that d
c
dq()
< 0 when evaluated at q() = qNB(), and so indeed a > .
We now discuss the role of our assumptions. First, note that concavity is all that
is needed for Lemma 6 to hold. Thus, the optimal procurement mechanism induces no
bribe in equilibrium as long as B(m) is concave. Now, if A1 is not satised, then the
best deviation for some type  may involve a mixture of bribing and positive quality
delivery. This, in turn, implies that (11) and (10) plus monotonicity do not guarantee
IC for all types, and further upper constraints on q may apply. The consequence would
be the need for ironingon q.
Also, if A2 does not hold, then the best bribing deviation for any type of contractor
may be to claim a type m below the type a obtained above. The optimal mechanism
could still be constructed from  down at a cost of complexity. For instance, if pNB() 
B(qNB()) is not monotone, but it is single peaked, the problem for the sponsor is very
similar to the one considered in Proposition 3 in what refers to the interval of types 
m; 

. There will be two types a and c in the interior of this interval and the optimal
mechanism prescribes for types in this interval what Proposition 3 prescribes for the
whole set of types. For types below m, the local incentive compatibility constraint that
denes qNB() and the global incentive-compatibility constraint associated to bribery
would both have to be satised. Therefore, we may construct the optimal q() from m
down as follows: for any  and given q() for 0 >  by setting q(), , as the minimum
of qNB() and the solution to
C(q; ) +
Z 

C(q(x);x)dx = B(q):
Summarizing, as in Section 2, concavity of B implies no bribe in the optimal mech-
anism, and under su¢ cient concavity (so that A1 and A2 are satised) bribery imposes
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a ceiling on the quality that the sponsor obtains from the contractor.
4.2 Convex B(m)
We now turn to the convex case and assume that B(m) is convex with B0(0) = 0.
Under this assumption, Lemma 6 no longer holds. Indeed, convexity of B together
with convexity of C implies that C(q   m; ) + B(m) is convex in m, for any q and
any . That is, after contracting any level of quality, the contractor achieves cost
minimization by partly bribing and partly delivering since Cq(0; ) = B0(0) = 0.
Given q(), incentive compatibility requires that m() solves
min
m2[0;q()]
C(q() m; ) +B(m):
Thus
 Cq(q() m; ) +B0(m) = 0; (12)
implicitly denes optimal m() as a function of quality q(). Equivalently, if bq = q m
is actual delivered quality,
 Cq(bq; ) +B0(m) = 0: (13)
denes m implicitly as an increasing function of delivered quality bq, given . Let this
solution be bm(bq; ). Note that bm() is increasing both in  and bq. Then, as in Section
3, bribery may be thought of as a modication of the cost of quality for each type.
This modied cost function is now
b(bq; ) = C(bq; ) +B(bm(bq; )):
A delivered quality bq will have a "cost" that is increased by the required bribe,
B(bm(bq; )) for a type . Once this cost modication is made, we face a standard
problem with a standard solution. As such, monotonicity of bq() and () is nec-
essary for implementation. It is also su¢ cient, given the corresponding denition of
p() and (13) as long as bq(q; ) > 0. A su¢ cient, but not neccesary, condition forbq(q; ) > 0 is that B00B0 is decreasing. Thus, the following proposition is just a corollary
of this discussion.
20
Proposition 8 If B(m) is convex, B00 decreasing, and Cqq > 0, then there exists d,
with  < d   such that at the optimal mechanism; (i) q() = 0 if  > d; and (ii) if
 < d, then q() solves
1  Cq(bq; )  Cq(bq; )F ()
f()
=
@B(bm(bq; ))
@bq + @2B(bm(bq; ))@bq@ F ()f() : (14)
The conditions on B00 and Cqq, guarantee that bbq(bq; ) + bbq(bq; )F ()f() is increasing
in bq and , so that the solution to (14) is monotone.12
Note that the right hand side of (14) is positive, as we are assuming B00 to be
decreasing. Thus, bq() < qNB() when interior. Types above d are optimally asked to
deliver zero quality. Finally, for  =  the right hand side of (14) is still positive. That
is, even for the most e¢ cient type, realized quality is distorted downwards. Indeed,
even for that type, realized quality is more expensive to produceunder bribery, since
its cost is increased by the associated bribe. Thus, as in the case of random but xed
bribes, quality distortion is optimally introduced for all types.
5 Implementation
After having characterized the optimal procurement rules, we now consider imple-
mentationof these rules with standard mechanisms. Consider the case of a xed and
known bribe, or the case where the required bribe is increasing and su¢ ciently con-
cave in the amount of manipulation. We have shown that the optimal mechanism in
this case coincides with the optimal mechanism under no corruption in the interior of
some interval of types. For types above this interval, quality should be zero and for
types below this interval, quality should be a constant. It is straightforward that such
rules would be implemented by any mechanism that implements the optimal rules in
the absence of corruption, with the only addition being a quality ceiling and a quality
oor. In the jargon of Section 2, these would be qNB(a) and qNB(c), respectively.
Thus, a menu of contracts similar to a rst-score auction, will implement the optimal
procurement: (q; p(q)) for q 2  qNB(c); qNB(a), where c and a are dened in the
12If this is not increasing, then once again monotoinicity would be violated by the solution to the
rst order conditions, and "ironing" would be needed.
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corresponding previous sections, and for each of these quality levels, p(q) = q  (q),
where
(q) = qNB(c)  C(qNB(c); c) +
qZ
qNB(c)
Cq
 
z; q 1NB(z)
 F (q 1NB(z))
f(q 1NB(z))
dz;
and where, q 1NB represents the inverse function of q
NB. Of course, the menu should be
complemented with the contract (p; q) = (0; 0). Following the analysis in the previous
sections, this is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 4 in Che (1993).
Likewise, the optimal procurement rules when the size of the bribe is uncertain,
and so optimally bribery takes place with some probability, may also be implemented
with a menu of contracts. However, the distortion in assessment of quality (q) is
more complex in this case. Indeed, now,
(q) = q(c)  C(q(c); c) +
qZ
q(c)
(z)dz;
where c and q() are dened in Proposition 5, and13
(z) = Cq
 
z; q 1(z)
 F (q 1(z))
f(q 1(z))
+
Cq
 
z; q 1(z)
 g(C (z; q 1(z)))
1 G(C (z; q 1(z)))

z   C  z; q 1(z)  C  z; q 1(z) F (q 1(z))
f(q 1(z))

:
(Note that (q) a¤ects the price, but not the tradeo¤ between bribing and delivering
quality.) This is the menu of contracts that implements optimal procurement for the
modied cost function  that we discussed in Section 3. Likewise, when B is a convex
function of manipulation satisfying the properties of Section 4, optimal procurement
may be achieved by o¤ering the contractor the optimal menu of contracts under the
modied cost function b, discussed in that section.
13Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 4 in Che (1993), it is easy to check that the second order
conditions are satised. Indeed, observe that (z) evaluated at q() is equal to the derivative fo the
sponsors surplus with respect to q at the optimal solution in Proposition 6 minus
1 G
g
(1  Cq):
The derivative of the sponsors surplus with respect to q is zero for all , evaluated at the optimal
solution. Thus, the partial of (z) with respect to q 1 is positive at the optimal solution. Since q 1
is a decreasing function and the partial of (z) with respect to z is negative, we conclude that (z)
is decreasing and so the second order conditions are satised.
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6 Concluding remarks
We have characterized the optimal procurement rules when the contractor may bribe
the inspector so that the latter manipulates quality assessment once the contract be-
tween contractor and sponsor has been signed. Even when it is optimal to prevent
bribery, the optimal rules distort quality downwards, not only for low-e¢ ciency types,
but also for the most e¢ cient contractors. This is the case when the bribe is of known
and of xed size or, more generally, under su¢ cient concavity of the bribe necessary
to secure a given level of manipulation. In these cases, bribery imposes a global (as
opposed to local) incentive-compatibility constraint, which compresses the variability
of quality that may be obtained. Thus, the sponsor optimally sets quality oors, but
also quality ceilings, to what absent corruption would be optimal.
When the bribe is su¢ ciently convex, or it is uncertain at the time of contracting,
totally avoiding bribery may be too expensive, and so the optimal mechanism is char-
acterized by some manipulation and bribe payments in equilibrium. In these cases,
bribery simply a¤ects local incentive-compatibility constraints. Still, quality is cur-
tailed as a means of reducing the incidence of manipulation. We have also considered
menu of contracts that implement these rules. When bribery sets a global constraint,
these are straightforward modications of an optimal menu of contracts in the absence
of bribery. The design of the menu is a little more involved when bribery sets local
incentive constraints.
We have assumed that the sponsor deals with only one potential contractor, and
also that the project should be undertaken with a probability of one. In the problem
analyzed in this paper, competition for the contract would introduce no new elements,
and the same can be said for the possibility of not contracting. Also, throughout the
paper, we have taken a reduced-form approach to bribery. All that we modelled of
the corrupt dealings between the contractor and the inspector was the contractors
payment/cost for such dealings, perhaps as a function of manipulation. This reduced
form is appropriate when the contractor has all the bargaining power when dealing with
the inspector. Otherwise, the bribe may depend on q, not only on m. This interaction
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between more general bargaining models and mechanism design is an interesting issue
that I leave for future research.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Given a IC, IR mechanism (p; q; b) (p0; q0; b0) where b0() = 0 8 2 [; ]; q0() =
q(), p0() = p() if b() = 0; and q0() = 0, p0() = p()   B if b() = 1. It
is straightforward that () is the same under both mechanisms for all . Also,
p0(z)   minz fC 0(q(z); ); Bg = p(z)   minz fC(q(z); ); Bg if b() = 0, and p0(z)  
minz fC 0(q(z); ); Bg = p(z)  B  p(z) minz fC(q(z); ); Bg if b() = 1, and so the
mechanism is incentive-compatible and individually rational. Finally, the sponsors
payo¤ is larger under (p0; q0; b0) if the probability that b() = 1 is positive.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
IC applied to types  +  and , require (; )  ( + ; ) and (;  + ) 
( + ;  + ), which simplies to
0  C(q( + ); )  C(q( + );  + )  (C(q(); )  C(q();  + )) ;
so that and since Cq > 0, we conclude that q() is indeed monotone decreasing.
We may bound q() without loss of generality, and thus, both () and q() are a.e.
di¤erentiable, and from (4) so is p. Also using (4), at any di¤erentiability point of
(),
p0() = Cq(q(); )q0()  0: (15)
At any non-di¤erentiability point, we can rule out a jump upwards from continuity of
() and C(q; ), and monotonicity of q().
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof when (5) holds for the optimal mechanism without bribery is trivial. Now,
assume that (5) is violated by the optimal mechanism without bribery, and consider
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the following free-time, xed-endpoint control problem
max
q()2[0;q()]
Z

fq()  C(q(); ) X()g f () d (16)
s:t: X 0 =  C(q(); );
with initial condition X() = B C(q(); ) and target point X() = 0, for some given
parameter q(). Note that
X() = X() +
Z

X 0(z)dz =
Z

C(q(z); z)dz ( = () ): (17)
The quality choice q in the optimal mechanism (p; q; b = 0) with p() dened by
(4) is a solution to this optimal control problem for q() = q() if it is monotone.
Also, at that solution q() = 0 for  >  . The Hamiltonian for this optimal control
problem is
H(;X; q) = fq()  C(q(); ) X()g f () + ( C(q(); ))
where  is the costate variable. Necessary conditions for interior solution include:
0 = f () ;
 Cq(q(); ) + (1  Cq(q(); ))f () = 0:
Integrating for 0, we obtain  = F (), and substituting in the second equation, we
obtain the same marginal condition (2) as without bribery for values of  <  at points
where the solution in q is interior to [0; q()]. Given our assumptions, this solution to
(2) is monotone decreasing. Therefore, if qNB() > q() at some , then the solution to
the control problem at that  is at a corner, q(), and when qNB() < q() but  <  ,
then q coincides with qNB. Thus, dening a as
qNB(a) = q(); (18)
the solution for  < a is q() = q(). If X() = 0 binds ( <  at the solution of the
control problem), and from (17) then   c, satises
B   C(q(); ) 
aZ

C(q
(); z)dz  
cZ
a
C(q
NB(z); z)dz = 0: (19)
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We now characterize the value q() in the optimal mechanism, and so the values
of a and c at the optimal mechanism. The sponsors expected surplus in the solution
to the control problem for a given value of q()  qNB() is:
aZ

8<:q()  C(q(); ) 
aZ

C(q(); z)dz  
cZ
a
C(q
NB(z); z)dz
9=; f () d +
cZ
a
8<:qNB()  C(qNB(); ) 
cZ

C(q
NB(z); z)dz
9=; f () d; (20)
where a is a function of q() dened in (18), and c is then also a function of q()
dened in (19). The derivative of (20) with respect to q() is
dc
dq()

qNB(c)  C(qNB(c); c) f (c)  C(qNB(c); c)F (c)	+ (21)
aZ

8<:1  Cq(q(); ) 
aZ

Cq(q(); z)dz
9=; f () d:
When evaluated at q() = qNB(), and so at a = , the second line vanishes. Also,
from (19), d
c
dq()
< 0. The curly brackets in the rst line is positive if qNB(c) > 0. Note
that indeed qNB(c) > 0 for c evaluated at q() = qNB() since otherwise (5) would
hold. Therefore, q() < qNB(). Also, changing the order of integration, the second
line in (21) is
aZ

f[1  Cq(q(); )] f ()  Cq(q(); )F ()g d > 0;
where the inequality follows from the fact that q() < qNB() for all  2 [; a) and the
integrand is zero evaluated at q = qNB(). Thus, at the optimal mechanism
qNB(c)  C(qNB(c); c) f (c)  C(qNB(c); c)F (c) > 0;
and so c < , since we are assuming that qNB() = 0.
8.4 Proof of Lemma 4
As before, assume that a type b bribes with probability 1. Then her prots are
p()   EB. That implies that any type  > b also bribes with probability 1, or else
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q() = 0. Indeed, () = (b), since type  can always imitate type b and obtain
the same prots, p() EB. But if q() > 0 and b() > B, then b would benet from
deviating and imitating type , since her costs are lower. Thus, assume that for all
types   b either q() = 0 or b() = B. Dene (p0; q0; b0) where (p0(); q0(); b0()) =
(p(); q(); b()) for all  < b, but (p0(); q0(); b0()) = (p()   EB; 0; B) for  > b.
Note that, conditional on truth-telling, the prots of all types are unchanged. Moreover,
the prots of any deviating type are still the same, and so (p0; q0; b0) is IC and IR. On
the other hand the payo¤ for the sponsor is larger, weakly so if the the measure of
types  > b with b() = B is zero.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the following optimal control problem
max
q()0
Z

fq()  C(q(); ) X()g f () d
s:t: X 0 =  C(q(); ) [1 G(C(q; ))] ;
with initial condition X() = 0. The quality q that maximizes (8) subject to (7) and
(6) is also a solution to this control problem if it satises IC. The Hamiltonian of the
problem is
H = f[1 G(C(q; ))] [q   C(q; )] X()g f()
+ [ C(q; ) [1 G(C(q; ))]] ;
so that again, for interior solution,
0 = f () ;
and so  = F () and @H
@q
= 0 can be written as
0 =
1 G(C(q; ))
g(C(q; ))

1  Cq(q; )  Cq(q; )F ()
f()

(22)
 Cq(q; )

q   C(q; )  C(q; )F ()
f()

:
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The right hand side is decreasing in q and , under our assumption that (1) is increasing
both in q and in , and 1 G(:)
g(:)
is decreasing. Thus, the solution q() is also decreasing.
Assume that there exists 0 that solves
0 = 1  Cq(0; )  Cq(0; )F ()
f()
+ g(0)C(0; )Cq(0; )
F ()
f()
:
Then, d = 0, and the solution is q() = 0 for all  > d. Otherwise, d = . For
 < d, (22) has a solution q() > 0.
8.6 Proof of Lemma 6
Assume m() > 0 for some value , and consider a change in the mechanism so that
q0() = q() m(), m0() = 0, and p0() = p()  B(m()). The prots of type  do
not change. Also, a type 0 imitating type  could achieve
p()  min
z2[0;q()]
fC (q()  z; 0) +B(z)g ;
with the original mechanism, whereas with the modied mechanism she can obtain
p0()  min
z2[0;q0()]
fC (q0()  z; 0) +B(z)g
= p() B(m())  min
z2[0;q() m()]
fC (q() m()  z; 0) +B(z)g
= p()  min
z2[0;q() m()]
C (q() m()  z; 0) +B(z) +B(m())
= p()  min
h2[m();q()]
C (q()  h; 0) +B(h m()) +B(m()):
where we have used the change of variable h = z + m(). This expression is smaller
since B is concave and the choice set of h is smaller than the choice set of z in the
original mechanism. The prots of 0 imitating any other type have not changed, and
the prots of  imitating any other type are not larger.
8.7 Proof of Proposition 7
The proof parallels that of Proposition 3, given q(). Thus, we need only show that
the sponsors surplus is maximized for q() < qNB(). The sponsors objective is still
given by (20), and so its derivative at qNB() is also given by (21). Then, we only need
29
show that d
c
dq()
< 0. Totally di¤erentiatin the equivalent now to (19),
B(q())  C(q(); ) 
aZ

C(q(); z)dz  
cZ
a
C(q
NB(z); z)dz = 0;
we have
dc
dq()
=
B0(q())  Cq(q(); ) 
aZ

Cq(q(); z)dz
C(qNB(
c); c)
< 0;
where the inequality follows from A2 and the fact that Cq(q; ) > 0.
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